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DEEP DANGER: INTENSIFIED COMPETITION IN 
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CHINA 
Guifang (Julia) Xue* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The South China Sea (SCS) has long been regarded as a major 
source of tension and instability in the region.  Over the years, numerous 
attempts to manage the SCS, prevent regional confrontation, and foster 
cooperation among concerned states have been recorded, but no 
promising results have been observed.  Since 2009, an upsurge in tension 
has sparked concern that the area may become a flashpoint with the 
potential for global consequences.1   
This Article examines the underlying issues surrounding the 
intensified competition in the SCS, and analyzes the implications of the 
ongoing tension for Chinese interests in the region.  Part II explains the 
significance of the SCS’s natural resources, strategic position, and 
international navigation routes, while also providing a portrait of the 
competing claims to SCS resources.  Part III illustrates the intensified 
competition triggered by the continental shelf submissions of some 
claimants, unilateral actions, maritime conflicts in disputed areas, and the 
involvement of non-regional states.  Part IV conducts a preliminary 
examination of the legal value of China’s maritime boundary—
commonly referred to as the U-Shaped Line—based on its evolution and 
                                            
 * Director, Institute for the Law of the Sea, Ocean University of China. 
  A version of this paper was originally presented at the University of Alberta as 
part of the Canada, US and China: Maritime Security Issues: The Arctic and the South 
China Sea—Sharpened Competition or Collaboration? Conference, held on September 
22-23, 2011. 
 1. See, e.g., THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: COOPERATION FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND 
DEVELOPMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP (Tran Truong Thuy ed., 
2010) [hereinafter SOUTH CHINA SEA], available at http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/ datbase-
on-south-china-sea-study/doc_details/36-the-south-china-sea-cooperation-for-regional-
security-and-development. 
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Chinese legislation.  Finally, Part V concludes that as the largest state 
bordering the SCS, and core party to the dispute, it is vital for China to 
define its claims based on international law, by bringing its claims into 
conformity with the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in order 
to serve its long term national interests.   
II.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCS AND MARITIME DISPUTES 
A.  Features of the SCS 
The SCS is a large semi-enclosed marginal ocean basin with a total 
area of 3.5 million square kilometers and an average depth of over 2000 
meters.2  The SCS contains four archipelagoes: the Dongsha Islands 
(Pratas), Zhongsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank), Xisha Islands 
(Paracels), and Nansha Islands (Spratlys).3  
The SCS is boarded by the East China Sea to the northeast, the 
Pacific Ocean and Sulu Sea to the east, and the Java Sea and Indian 
Ocean to the southwest.  Lying between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 
the SCS serves the function of a “maritime super highway” and “vital 
international passage.”4  The SCS is “one of the world’s most important 
and densely used straights for international navigation.”5  
The states bordering the SCS vary greatly in size, geography, social 
and cultural structures, and economic and political systems.6  Many of 
the states have contested claims to different parts of the SCS, particularly 
islands.7  Of the disputed claims, the status of the Spratlys has been the 
most contentious and has resulted in several military clashes in the past 
forty years, particularly between China and Vietnam.8  The international 
                                            
 2. South China Sea, CHINA OCEANIC INFO. NETWORK, 
http://www.coi.gov.cn/scs/introduction/gaikuang.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 3. Mark J. Valencia, The South China Sea: Prospects for Marine Regionalism, 2 
MARINE POL’Y 87, 88 (1978). 
 4. David Rosenberg, Why a South China Sea Website?, SOUTH CHINA SEA, 
http://www.southchinasea.org/why-a-south-china-sea-website-an-introductory-essay (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
 5. See Choon-ho Park, EAST ASIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 283-84 (1983).  
 6. Besides China, countries bordering the SCS include: Taiwan, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Laos, and Indonesia. 
See generally Valencia, supra note 3, at 87.  
 7. See Christopher C. Joyner, The Spratly Islands Dispute: Rethinking the Interplay 
of Law, Diplomacy, and Geo-Politics in the South China Sea, 13 INT’L J. MARINE & 
COASTAL L.  193, 195 (1998).  
 8. See Choon-ho Park, The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and 
the Natural Resources?, 5 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 27, 30 (1978) (discussing disputes 
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Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime has intensified these claims, 
making the disputes, and therefore the solutions, more complex and 
demanding.9 
Bordered by the world’s rapidly industrializing countries and 
growing economies, the SCS also functions as a central component of the 
Southeast Asian and world economies.10  The SCS natural resources are 
of significance both globally and worldwide.11  Accordingly, ongoing 
disputes and competition over resources in the SCS have attracted global 
attention in the past decades.12  
Because the SCS extends across tropical and semi-tropical zones 
with a typical monsoon climate, the SCS has a large and complex marine 
ecosystem and an abundant variety of resources.13  This has attracted 
coastal states to develop fisheries industries.14  Among coastal states 
bordering the SCS, China harvests the largest quantity of fish.15 Because 
of the population of its coastal provinces, the fishing grounds of the SCS 
are an important part of China’s fisheries.16  
The SCS is also rich in oil and gas.17  The abundance of vital 
resources is one of the most important considerations sparking the 
territorial disputes.18  The intensified competition for SCS resources has 
seen a rise in the number of disputes.19  These disputes, mixed with 
                                                                                                  
over the Spratly Islands); see also GREG AUSTIN, CHINA'S OCEAN FRONTIER: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, MILITARY FORCE AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 131-61 (1998) 
(discussing China’s claims in the SCS).  
 9. See Joyner, supra note 7, at 194. 
 10. See Energy Info. Admin., Country Analysis Briefs: South China Sea, ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/emeu/cabs/South_China_Sea/pdf.pdf (last updated 
Mar. 11, 2008). 
 11. See id.  
 12. See, e.g., Zhiguo Gao, The South China Sea: From Conflict to Cooperation? 25 
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 345, 345 (1994).  See also JI GUOXING, MARITIME JURISDICTION 
IN THE THREE CHINA SEAS: OPTIONS FOR EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT 3-29 (2005), available 
at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/7rq2b069. 
 13. Joyner, supra note 7, at 194; see also Park, supra note 9, at 37. 
 14. See GUIFANG XUE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES LAW AND POLICY, 207-8 
(2005). 
 15. See SHIFU XIA ET AL., CHINA FISHERY DIVISIONS: A SURVEY AND DIVISION ON 
CHINA'S FISHERY RESOURCES 166-71 (1982) (providing an overview of China’s fishing 
grounds in the SCS). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Energy Info. Admin., supra note 10. 
 18. See GAO, supra note 12, at 349. 
 19. Park, supra note 8, at 37.  
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overlapping territorial claims, have resulted in numerous clashes.20  
These clashes often result in the loss of property and life.21  As a 
consequence, the SCS has become a site of tension with the potential for 
greater conflict.  This has made access to SCS waters problematic and 
dangerous.  
B.  Maritime Disputes in the SCS 
Over the decades, the SCS has drawn global attention not only for its 
strategic location, resource competition, and security considerations, but 
also for its multiple sovereignty and maritime jurisdictional disputes. 
Until 1958, there were no sovereignty disputes in the SCS.22  Since 
the 1960s, with the creation of an international law of the sea regime by 
four Geneva Conventions, disputes over insular features started to 
emerge, causing stress between relevant states.23  When UNCLOS’s 
negotiation began in the 1970s, it increased these stresses, and some SCS 
states started to make claims and take unilateral actions to control the 
features near their coast.24  Since the 1970s, China’s maritime neighbors 
have taken control over some of the Spratlys features.25  When UNCLOS 
was signed in 1982 and entered into force in 1994, SCS disputes were 
irrevocably intensified.26  
Six claims are presently asserted to the SCS islands or waters.  China 
and Taiwan both claim sovereignty over the four groups of insular 
features—an area enclosed by a U-Shaped Line based on discovery, 
historical usage, and effective occupation and control.27  China controls 
                                            
 20. See, e.g., Daojiong Zha, China's Exploitation of South China Sea Resources: The 
Case of Hainan Province (IUJ Research Institute Working Paper: Asia Pacific Series No. 
15, 2000), available at http://www.iuj.ac.jp/research/workingpapers/PIRS_2000_03.html.  
 21. See generally Nguyen Hong Thao, Vietnam and the Code of Conduct for the South 
China Sea, 32 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 105 (2001). 
 22. See generally MARWYN S. SAMUELS, CONTEST FOR THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (1982) 
(discussing the evolution of the SCS disputes).  
 23. See U.N., NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE 
SEA, ST/LEG/SER.B/18 (1980).  
 24. See SAMUELS, supra note 22, at 75-93.   
 25. See MARK J. VALENCIA, JON M. VAN DYKE, & NOEL A. LUDWIG, SHARING THE 
RESOURCES OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 17-40 (1997) [hereinafter SHARING THE 
RESOURCES]. 
 26. Id.; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 27. Jurisprudential Evidence to Support China's Sovereignty Over the Nansha 
Islands, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Nov. 17, 2000), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3754/t19234.htm 2000.  
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the Paracels and seven features of the Spratlys.28  Taiwan controls the 
Pratas, the largest archipelago in the SCS, and Taiping Island (Itu Aba), 
the largest island in the Spratlys.29  The Chinese claims have been 
challenged by other SCS coastal states making similar claims based on 
EEZ and continental shelf principles established by UNCLOS.30 
Far more prominent has been the long-simmering dispute between 
China and Vietnam over both the Paracels (Hoang Sa in Vietnamese) and 
Spratlys (Truong Sa in Vietnamese).31  Vietnam claims that it discovered 
and has actively ruled over both since the seventeenth century, and 
currently controls twenty-one features of the latter.32  Vietnam hotly 
disputes China's historical account, and insists that China never claimed 
sovereignty over the islands until the 1940s, although it officially 
recognized the sovereignty claim to the four SCS archipelagos by the 
Chinese government in 1958.33  
The Philippines maintains separate claims to a portion of the Spratlys 
and controls eight of them, known as the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), 
based on discovery, occupation, and geo-proximity.34  Malaysia lays its 
claim over certain parts of the Spratly islands and reefs also on geo-
proximity and controls eight islands that they fall within their continental 
shelf.35  Brunei claims two reefs and a maritime zone based on natural 
prolongation of its continental shelf.36  
Among the numerous territorial disputes, the Spratlys dispute is 
probably the most serious to date.  The Spratlys are a group of small 
islands, reefs and atolls, cays, shoals, and sandbars in the SCS believed 
to be sitting atop vast oil and gas reserves.37  These disputes mainly 
                                            
 28. The seven features are: Chigua Jiao (Johnson Reef), Huanyang Jiao (Cuarteron 
Reef), Yongshu Jiao (Fiery Cross Reef), Zhubi Jiao (Subi Reef), Meiji Jiao (Mischief 
Reef), Dongmen Jiao (Hughes Reef), and Nanxun Jiao (Gaven Reef).  Wendy N. Duong, 
Following the Path of Oil: The Law of the Sea or Realpolitik—What Good Does Law Do 
in the South China Sea Territorial Conflicts?, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1098, 1148 (2007). 
 29. Christopher C. Joyner, The Spratly Islands Dispute: What Role for Normalizing 
Relations Between China and Taiwan?, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 819, 835 (1998).  
 30. Duong, supra note 28, at 1115. 
 31. See HAN ZHENHUA, COLLECTIONS OF THE INVESTIGATION ON HISTORICAL AND 
GEOGRAPHICAL DOCUMENTATIONS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISLANDS 182 (1981). 
 32. See SHARING THE RESOURCES, supra note 25, at 20-29.  
 33. See Richard D. Beller, Note, Analyzing the Relationship Between International 
Law and International Politics in China's and Vietnam's Territorial Dispute Over the 
Spratly Islands, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 293, 309 (1994). 
 34. See SHARING THE RESOURCES, supra note 25, at 34. 
 35. Id. at 36. 
 36. Id. at 38.  
 37. Duong, supra note 28, at 1102. 
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concern the ownership of some mid-ocean islets of the Spratlys, most of 
which are reefs without much value in themselves, but the owner of the 
Spratlys islets will be entitled to sovereign rights in a number of 
maritime zones, and natural resources may be developed from the 
offshore waters of the islets.38  None of these islets had been inhabited 
historically, but in the recent half century the competing claimants, 
except Brunei, have built up structures and garrisoned most of their 
controlling features.39  Another appealing feature of ownership over the 
Spratleys is the sea lane between the archipelagoes is the major route that 
links East Asia with Africa and Europe.40 
 The fact that the competing claims of several states overlap makes 
the situation more difficult than relatively simple bilateral disputes.  The 
issue is further complicated by the expansion of the dispute in recent 
years to include boundary delimitation, entitlement of islands and rocks, 
navigational freedoms, and military activities involving states from 
outside the region.41  Besides a host of disputes and competition, the SCS 
is presently facing problems of security challenges and dreadful 
conditions of state relations. It is difficult to reach any consensus with 
such a complex situation. Accordingly, no conclusive answer readily 
available.  
III.  INTENSIFIED COMPETITION OVER THE SCS DISPUTES 
The SCS claimants can rarely find agreement on any issue relating to 
the archipelagos, especially in the latter half of the past century. 
Negotiations remain deadlocked due to divergent views in their claims, 
including what to call the disputed islets.42 Despite little progress in 
resolving contradictory claims, the regional seascape has witnessed 
several additional features since the new century.43  Competition has 
been intensified due to a number of factors including the various 
submissions of claims to the outer limit of the continental shelf, the 
resulting barrage of protests and assertions via diplomatic notes, 
                                            
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1138. 
 40. Id. at 1105. 
 41. See generally id. at 1122. 
 42. For general information on the national interests of states bordering the SCS, see 
generally BOB CATLEY & MARKMUR KELIAT, SPRATLYS: THE DISPUTE IN THE SOUTH 
CHINA SEA (1997). 
 43. Nguyen Hong Thao, South China Sea—Three Stages, Four Challenges, Two 
Regional Approaches and One Belief, in THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: TOWARDS A REGION OF 
PEACE, SECURITY AND COOPERATION 269 (Tran Truong Thuy ed., 2011). 
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unilateral enforcement actions resulting in at-sea conflicts, and the 
involvement of non-regional states putting extra pressure on international 
relations.44  All these factors have adversely affected the operating 
system for dispute settlement. Therefore, a description of the various 
forms of ongoing competition follows.  
A.  War of Diplomatic Notes Triggered by Extended 
 Continental Shelf Submissions 
The key impetus for the seascape change in the SCS was the final 
rush towards the May 13, 2009 deadline for the submission of claims to 
an extended continental shelf (ECS) to the United Nation’s Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).45  On April 8, 2009, the 
Philippines made the first submission among the SCS claimants to the 
CLCS.46 The Philippine claim concerned the Benham Rise region.47  
Next, on May 6, 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam submitted a joint proposal 
concerning the southern part of the SCS.48  The next day, Vietnam also 
lodged a submission in the area north of that covered by its joint 
submission with Malaysia.49 Unlike the Philippine submission, the 
Malaysian and Vietnamese submissions immediately attracted the 
attention of China and aroused a sequence of protests in the form of note 
                                            
 44. See supra Parts I, II. 
 45. This deadline was set according to article 4 of Annex II of UNCLOS and a 
Decision adopted by the Meeting of States Parties (SPLOS/72). Oceans & Law of the 
Sea, U.N., Issues With Respect to Article 4 of Annex II to the Convention (Ten-year 
Time Limit for Submissions), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/ 
issues_ten_years.htm (last visited May 5, 2012). 
 46. U.N. Secretary-General, Receipt of the Submission Made by the Republic of the 
Philippines to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. 09/132 
(Apr. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_phl_22_2009.htm. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See U.N., Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer 
Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: 
Submissions to the Commission: Joint Submission by Malaysia and the Socialist 
Republic of Viet Nam (May 6, 2009), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/ 
submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm [hereinafter Joint Submission].  
 49. See SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET., SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS 
OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 76, PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF SEA 1982: PARTIAL SUBMISSION IN RESPECT OF 
VIETNAM’S EXTENDED CONTINENTAL SHELF: NORTH AREA (VNM-N) (2009), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/vnm2009n_executiv
esummary.pdf. 
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verbales contesting the various claims.50  As a result, numerous 
assertions, responses, and protests from nations throughout the SCS 
ensued in the form of diplomatic notes.51  
On May 7, 2009, China strongly objected to the Malaysian and 
Vietnamese submissions by submitting two note verbales to the CLCS.52  
China asserted that it possessed “indisputable sovereignty over the 
islands in the [SCS] and the adjacent waters, and enjoy[ed] sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and 
subsoil.”53 Further, China claimed that the Malaysian and Vietnamese 
submissions “seriously infringed [on] China’s sovereignty, sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction in the [SCS],” and requested that the CLCS not 
consider the two submissions.54  
The Philippines had a similar reaction as China to the Malaysian and 
Vietnamese submissions.55  On August 4, 2009, the Philippines filed two 
note verbales with the CLCS to protest the submissions.56  The 
Philippines stated that both submissions “la[id] claim on areas that are 
disputed . . . because they overlap with [those] of the Philippines.”57 The 
Philippines also mentioned its historical claim to North Borneo (the 
present day East Malaysian State of Sabah).58 
It is worth mentioning that, with the two May 7, 2009 notes, China 
attached its U-Shaped Line map to specify the boundary of its claim in 
                                            
 50. See Robert C. Beckman & Tara Davenport, CLCS Submissions and Claims in the 
South China Sea, EAST SEA (SOUTH CHINA SEA) STUDIES (Aug. 16, 2010), 
http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/conferences-and-seminars-/second-international-
workshop/608-clcs-submissions-and-claims-in-the-south-china-sea-by-robert-c-beckman-
a-tara-davenport. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale CML/17/2009 (May 7, 2009) 
[hereinafter CML/17/2009], available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/ 
submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf; People’s Republic of 
China, Note Verbale CML/18/2009 (May 7, 2009)  [hereinafter CML/18/2009], available 
at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009 
re_vnm.pdf. 
 53. See CML/17/2009, supra note 52, ¶ 2; CML/18/2009, supra note 52, ¶ 2. 
 54. See CML/17/2009, supra note 52, ¶ 3; CML/18/2009, supra note 52, ¶ 3. 
 55. See Republic of Philippines, Note Verbale 000819 (Aug. 4, 2009) [hereinafter 
Note 000819], available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ 
mysvnm33_09/clcs_33_2009_los_phl.pdf, and Republic of Philippines, Note Verbale 
000818 (Aug. 4, 2009)  [hereinafter Note 000818], available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/vnm_re_phl_200
9re_mys_vnm_e.pdf. 
 56. Note 000819, supra 55, ¶ 2; Note 000818, supra note 55, ¶ 2. 
 57. Note 000819, supra 55, ¶ 2; Note 000818, supra note 55, ¶ 2.  
 58. Note 000819, supra note 55, ¶ 2. 
2012] Deep Danger 315 
 
the SCS.59  These two Chinese notes—and particularly the attached 
map—have generated additional concerns and protests.60 Claimants 
(such as Vietnam and Malaysia) and non-claimants (such as Indonesia) 
have filed diplomatic notes to protest China’s claims.61  
Vietnam quickly rejected China’s claim via a note verbale submitted 
to CLCS on May 8, 2009, in response to China’s May 7, 2009 note.62  In 
defending its earlier submissions as “legitimate undertakings,” Vietnam 
reaffirmed its claim concerning its “indisputable sovereignty” over the 
Paracels and Spratlys archipelagoes.63  Vietnam further declared that 
“China’s claim over the islands and adjacent waters in the Eastern Sea 
(South China Sea) as manifested in the map . . . has no legal, historical or 
factual basis.”64  
Vietnam also responded to the Philippine notes in its August 18, 
2009 note.65  Vietnam stated that its submissions were “legitimate 
undertakings” consistent with the provisions of UNCLOS and made 
without prejudice to boundary delimitations with relevant States.66  It 
also took the “opportunity to reaffirm its consistent position that Viet 
Nam has indisputable sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys 
archipelagoes.”67   
On May 20, 2009, Malaysia submitted a note verbale in response to 
China’s note.68  The Malaysian note stated that its joint submission was a 
legitimate undertaking and was made without prejudice to boundary 
delimitations or the positions of maritime disputes.69  Furthermore, 
Malaysia noted that it had informed “China of its position prior to the 
                                            
 59. CML/17/2009, supra note 52; CML/18/2009, supra note 52. 
 60. See Tessa Jamandre, China Accuses PH of “Invasion,” ABS-CBN NEWS (Apr. 19, 
2011, 11:10 PM), http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/04/19/11/china-accuses-ph-
%E2%80%98invasion%E2%80%99. 
 61. Beckman & Davenport, supra note 50. 
 62.  Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Note Verbale No. 86/HC-2009 (May 8, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/vnm_chn_2009r
e_mys_vnm_e.pdf [hereinafter 86/HC-2009].  
 63. Id. ¶ 3.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Note Verbale No. 240 HC-2009 (Aug. 18, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/vnm_re_phl_20
09re_mys_vnm_e.pdf. 
 66. See id. ¶¶ 2-3. 
 67. Id. ¶ 4.  
 68. Malaysia, Note Verbale HA 24/09 (May 20, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/mys_re_chn_20
09re_mys_vnm_e.pdf. 
 69. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 
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submission,” but did not mention if China had been invited to join the 
joint submission.70  
On August 21, 2009, Malaysia also filed a note verbale in response 
the Philippines’ note.71  In addition to stating that its undertakings were 
legitimate, Malaysia pointed out that it had informed the Philippines of 
its position prior to the joint submission, and that both Vietnam and 
Malaysia had proposed that the Philippines join them in that 
submission.72 Malaysia also firmly denied the Philippines’ claim to 
North Borneo.73   
Although Indonesia is not an SCS claimant, on July 8, 2010, it 
submitted a note verbale to the CLCS expressing its concerns about 
China’s U-Shaped Line.74  The note questioned the map’s consistency 
with international law, specifically attacking its “legal basis, the method 
of drawing, and the status of th[e] separated dotted-lines.”75  The 
Indonesian note also expressed concern as to whether China would adopt 
the same position it openly expressed regarding the Okinitorishima rocks 
to the other small insular features in SCS.76  Indonesia stated that the 
“remote or very small features in the South China Sea do not deserve 
exclusive economic zones or continentals shelf of their own.”77  
Indonesia argued that allowing these small features to generate such 
zones would “concern[] the fundamental principles of the Convention 
and encroach[] on the legitimate interest of the global community.”78 
Almost ten months after the Indonesian note, the Philippines filed a 
note verbale with the CLCS protesting China’s U-Shaped Line.79  This 
protest was lodged on April 5, 2011, nearly two years after China 
submitted its map to the CLCS.80  Additionally—and more 
                                            
 70. Id. ¶ 4. 
 71.  Malaysia, Note Verbale HA 41/09 (Aug. 21, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/mys_re_phl_20
09re_mys_vnm_e.pdf. 
 72. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4. 
 73. Id. ¶ 5.  
 74. Republic of Indonesia, Note Verbale No. 480/POL-703/VII/10 (July 8, 2010), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_my
s_vnm_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
 75. Id. ¶ 2. 
 76. Id. ¶ 2-3. 
 77. Id. ¶ 3. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Republic of the Philippines, Note Verbale 000228 (Apr. 5, 2011), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/phl_re_chn_201
1.pdf [hereinafter Note 000228]. 
 80. Id.  Cf. CML/17/2009, supra note 52. 
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importantly—this note relates to a much earlier argument between the 
two.81  
In February 2009, China and the Philippines sparred over the 
sovereignty and jurisdiction over Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal, 
also referred to as Bajo de Masinloc by the Philippines) as well as some 
islands and submerged reefs of the KIG in the SCS.82  Tensions rose 
when the Philippines enacted its Archipelagic Baseline Act,83 on March 
11, 2009, which amended its baselines law to prepare for its partial ECS 
submission.84  The Act claims an island regime under the UNCLOS 
article 121 for the KIG.85  
The Archipelagic Baseline Act was vigorously protested by China’s 
note verbale of April 13, 2009.86  China argued that, “Huangyan Island 
and Nansha Islands have been part of the territory of China since ancient 
time,” and that China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands and 
the surrounding areas.87 
Instead of immediately replying, the Philippines postponed its 
response for two years.88 On April 5, 2011, the Philippines submitted a 
note verbale to protest China’s claim.89 The note is quite lengthy for its 
nature, and confronts China’s claim to the SCS islands and other 
geological features, as well as their adjacent waters, seabed, and 
subsoil.90 Among their challenges, the Philippines made it clear that KIG 
“constitutes an integral part of the Philippines,” and that the Philippines 
has “sovereignty and jurisdiction over . . . [KIG’s] geological features.”91  
The Philippines also argued that it exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction 
over the waters adjacent to each geological feature in the KIG under 
                                            
 81. Id.  
 82. See Henry Goa, Sino-Philippines Dispute (Not Trade-Related), WTO AND CHINA 
(Feb. 21, 2009, 11:24AM), http://wtoandchina.blogspot.com/2009/02/sino-philippines-
dispute-not-trade.html. 
 83. An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by 
Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines, and for 
Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 9522, (Mar. 11, 2009) (Phil.), available at 
http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ra_14/RA09522.pdf.   
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. § 2; UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 121, at 578. 
 86. People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale CML/12/2009 (Apr. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/communi
cationsredeposit/mzn69_2009_chn.pdf. 
 87. Id. ¶ 2.   
 88. Note 000228, supra note 79. 
 89. Id. 
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 91. Id. ¶ 3. 
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UNCLOS’s principle that the land dominates the sea.92 The Philippines 
argued that this principal applied to “the extent [that] the waters that are 
‘adjacent’ to the relevant geological features [if they] are definite and 
determinable under UNCLOS, specifically under Article 121 (Regime of 
Islands) of the said Convention.”93 The Philippines argued that because 
waters adjacent to the geological features in the KIG are definite and 
subject to legal and technical measurement, China's claims “on the 
relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil” outside of the 
geological features have “no basis under international law, specifically 
UNCLOS.”94  
China promptly replied to this protest on April 14, 2011 by 
submitting a note verbale to the CLCS.95 In the note, China branded the 
contents of the Philippine note as “totally unacceptable” to China’s 
“indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the 
adjacent water.”96 Moreover, China claimed that “since the 1970s, the 
Philippines has invade[d] and occup[ied] some islands and reefs of 
China’s Nansha Islands and made relevant territorial claims, to which 
China objects strongly.”97 China went further, stressing that under 
UNCLOS, “China’s Nansha Islands is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, 
[EEZ] and Continental Shelf.”98 
In addition to asserting sovereignty and jurisdiction in the SCS, 
China also contended that in the “series of international treaties which 
define the limits of the territory of the Republic of Philippines and the 
domestic legislation of the Republic of Philippines prior to 1970s. . . . 
[the] Philippines had never made any claims to Nansha Islands or any of 
its components.”99 China also clarified that “[t]he so-called [KIG] 
claimed by the Republic of Philippines is in fact part of China’s Nansha 
Islands,” and that this fact has been “given publicity” since the 1930s.100  
Refuting the Philippines’s assertion of sovereignty and jurisdiction 
over the waters adjacent to the relevant features of the KIG, China stated 
                                            
 92. Shi Jiuyong, Maritime Delimitation in the Jurisprudence of the International 
Court of Justice, 9 CHINESE J. OF INT. L. 271, 275 (2010). 
 93. Note Verbale 000228, supra note 79, at ¶¶ 4-5.  
 94. Id. ¶ 6.  
 95. People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale CML/8/2011 (Apr. 14, 2011), 
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 96. Id. ¶ 2. 
 97. Id. ¶ 3. 
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that the Philippines cannot, “[u]nder the legal doctrine of ‘ex injuria jus 
non oritur’101 . . . , invoke such [an] illegal occupation to support its 
territorial claims.”102 China asserted that by virtue of “the legal principle 
of ‘la terre domine la mer,’103 coastal states’ [EEZ] and Continental 
Shelf claims shall not infringe upon the territorial sovereignty of other 
States.”104  In addition, China argued that under UNCLOS, as well as 
China’s domestic laws, “China’s Nansha Islands is [sic] fully entitled to 
Territorial Sea, [EEZ] and Continental Shelf.”105 
This exchange between China and the Philippines regarding SCS 
islands generated a subsequent reaction from Vietnam.106  Vietnam 
submitted a new note on May 3, 2011 in response to Philippine Note No. 
000228 and Chinese Note CML/8/2011.107 The Vietnamese note did not 
raise any new issues, but simply reiterated Vietnam’s claims to the 
Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes in identical language.108  
In summation, the submissions for an ECS in the disputed areas of 
the SCS have caused a series of strong protests through the exchange of 
diplomatic notes.  According to the Rules of Procedure of the 
Commission, the CLCS is not likely to consider either the joint 
submission of Malaysia and Vietnam or the submission of Vietnam.109 
“While the submissions and accompanying objections are very complex, 
the practical effect of these submissions has the potential to have a 
significant impact on the South China Sea disputes.”110 The diplomatic 
notes submitted to the CLCS not only function as assertive actions to 
form the legal basis for the states’ respective positions, but also result “in 
several of the claimants bringing their claims into conformity with their 
rights and obligations under UNCLOS.”111 However, the war of 
diplomatic notes also reveals the complexity of the SCS disputes and the 
difficulties in addressing them.  
                                            
 101. “Law does not arise from injustice.” 
 102. Id. ¶ 3. 
 103. “The land dominates the sea.” 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. ¶ 4.  
 106. Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Note Verbale FF/HC-2011 (May 3, 2011), 
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 109. Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 
Annex I 5(a), U.N. Doc. CLCS/40/Rev. 1 (Apr. 17, 2008).  
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B. “Heavy Smoke” Caused by Unilateral Actions and At-Sea Conflicts 
In addition to diplomatic protests, the SCS has seen an increase in 
the number of unilateral actions and maritime conflicts; all the SCS 
claimants have endeavored to build up naval capabilities and enhance 
maritime surveillance in the claimed areas.112  For example, some 
claimants have conducted live-fire drills in disputed waters resulting in 
escalated tensions.113 “Incidents at sea involving clashes between vessels 
of the different . . . [states] have become regular occurrences in the South 
China Sea.”114 
China has sought to enhance its naval forces and increase its 
enforcement capacity.  China’s fisheries laws and policies—implemented 
to deal with depletion of fisheries resources—have also caused concern 
in the SCS.115  Specifically, China’s annual fishing ban has been under 
constant challenge in the SCS.116  Despite the fact that the annual fishing 
ban applies mainly to China’s traditional fishing grounds, it has long 
been a problem for its maritime neighbors, particularly Vietnam.117  
China and Vietnam share both land and maritime boundaries and 
have been engaged in a longstanding dispute over both boundaries.118  
The two governments settled their land boundary in 1999, finally putting 
to rest a centuries-old border issue.119 “The maritime boundary between 
China and Vietnam extends seaward from the termination of the land 
                                            
 112. See generally Duong, supra note 28, at 1173. 
 113. See US, Vietnam Hold Military Drills in South China Sea, GLOBAL TIMES, June 
25, 2011, http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/663217/US-Vietnam-hold-
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 114. Rajaratnam Sch. of Int’l Studies, Ensuring Safety at Sea: The Southern Ocean and 
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 118. See Mark J. Valencia & Jon M. Van Dyke, Vietnam's National Interests and the 
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Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin, 30 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 235, 
248 (1999).  
 119. The Sino-Vietnam Land Border Treaty between China and Vietnam was signed in 
December 1999 and came into effect in July 2000.  See Sino-Vietnam Border Treaties 
Equal to Both Countries, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ 
200201/24/eng20020124_89291.shtml (last updated Jan. 25, 2002). 
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border into the Gulf of Tonkin and out to the [SCS].”120 Based on 
UNCLOS’s framework, the two governments settled their maritime 
boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin on December 25, 2000.121  
China and Vietnam are the most vocal in their sovereignty claims 
over the SCS archipelagos.122 These competing claims have complicated 
their bilateral relations.123 Over the years, the two have been involved in 
armed disputes, diplomatic disputes, and conflicts involving fishing 
vessels and maritime surveillance ships.124 In 2010, six incidents 
occurred between China and Vietnam, mostly regarding fishing 
vessels.125  
China and the Philippines have also maintained a certain level of 
conflict, manifesting itself in regard to gas exploration and survey ship 
confrontations.126  The Reed Bank Incident serves as a good example.  
The Reed Bank is part of the KIG and is claimed by both China and 
Vietnam. On March 2, 2011, two Chinese patrol vessels approached a 
Philippine survey ship conducting a seismic survey near Reed Bank and 
ordered it to cease its activities because the area was under Chinese 
jurisdiction.127  In response, the Philippine military deployed a warplane 
and two coastguard vessels to escort the survey ship “until its survey 
activities had been completed.”128  
Following the incident, the Philippines undertook a number of 
measures including strengthening the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP) presence in the Spratlys, conducting unilateral actions to enhance 
its claim in the SCS, and protesting China’s sovereignty claims in the 
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SCS.129  The Philippines also strengthened its air force presence in the 
KIG by upgrading its military airfield, observation planes, and vessels to 
escort survey ships.130  In May 2011, the Philippines removed China’s 
markers and construction material from Boxhall Reef, Amy Douglas 
Bank, and Reed Bank.131  Additionally, Philippine lawmakers visited 
Pagasa (Hope) Island, the largest Filipino-occupied feature in the SCS on 
July 20, 2011.  There, they pledged funds to improve the islet’s 
infrastructure, including allocations for a water purification system, a 
cold storage facility, harbor and pier improvements, and runway 
improvements.132  
China has responded to some of these unilateral actions, as well as to 
live-fire military exercises, by stating that they will impair bilateral 
ties.133  China has also called on other parties to stop exploiting resources 
in areas where China claims sovereignty.134   Nevertheless, some 
claimants have strengthened ties with non-regional states, particularly 
with the U.S.135 
Recognizing the growing military and economic importance of the 
SCS, the United States has been paying greater attention to the region.  
On July 23, 2010, the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, made a 
spoke at the seventeenth Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Regional Forum, expressing the U.S.’ views on its “national interest” in 
freedom of navigation (FON) and continued open access to the SCS.136  
This event marked a turning point concerning the SCS, reframing the 
issues from hypothetical discussions on whether it is one of China’s 
“core interests” into a diplomatic subject matter for the Asian-Pacific 
region.137   
The United States has supported the operations of FON rights in the 
international waters and air space of the SCS.138  However, the United 
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States believes that FON is much broader than transiting the waters, and 
includes other lawful uses of the sea, such as military activities, counter-
piracy operations, and counter-proliferation operations.139  
Regarding military activities, UNCLOS does not clearly provide for 
military uses by non-coastal states in another state’s EEZ.140  The United 
States holds the position that UNCLOS in no way limits military 
activities in the EEZ, so long as they are compatible with the reservation 
of the seas for peaceful purposes.141  As a result, several serious 
incidents involving U.S. air and naval reconnaissance in China’s EEZ 
have occurred, such as the Impeccable Incident on March 9, 2009, which 
have strained bilateral relations and affected China’s SCS claim.142  
Concerning EEZ enforcement, China recently adopted domestic 
measures to control the activities of other states in its EEZ, resulting in 
some debate about these measures’ legality.143 According to UNCLOS, 
EEZs are areas of shared rights and responsibilities between coastal 
states and foreign states.144  China holds the view that a coastal state is 
entitled to control its EEZ, as provided by UNCLOS.145  The EEZ is a 
special regime, and referred to as neither a territorial sea nor a high 
sea.146  Further, China considers the EEZ to serve as a buffer zone for 
defense.147  The EEZ is a relatively new regime in international law, and 
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the precise nature and scope of a nation’s rights and responsibilities 
within an EEZ are still evolving.148  
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA: THE NEED TO BRING ITS CLAIM INTO 
CONFORMITY WITH UNCLOS 
While SCS disputes intensify, some legal and political issues have 
been raised in current discussions.  There is heightened interest in 
China’s theory and practice of international law, and inquiries have been 
assembled about legal principles for China to sustain its claims over 
islands, adjacent waters, seabed, and subsoil in the SCS.149  China has 
been under mounting pressure to define its claims.150 
A.  Clarifying Claims within the U-shaped Line 
China’s U-Shaped Line is composed of nine dashes and extends to 
the southern part of the SCS.151  It generally follows a median-line 
pattern adjacent to the shores of Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, 
and the Philippines.152  The original version of the U-Shaped Line first 
appeared in a Chinese map in 1914, drawn by Chinese cartographer Hu 
Jin Jie.153 This version of the line was officially confirmed by China in 
1947.154  It was composed of eleven dashes and titled The Location Map 
of the South China Sea Islands.155  In 1953, China removed two dashes 
from the Gulf of Tonkin.156 
Although the U-Shaped Line was on official Chinese maps, China 
neither explained the exact legal value of the line nor the status of the 
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waters inside the line.157  In the past decades, the origin and evolution of 
the U-Shaped Line has been thoroughly examined and mostly agreed 
upon,158 but views on the legal status of the U-Shaped Line have been 
divided as to its historical waters or title line, territorial border or 
maritime boundary line, and island attribution line.159  In recent decades, 
the legislative practice of the Chinese government relating to the U-
shaped line and SCS archipelagos has been somewhat neglected.160 
Nevertheless, China’s fundamental laws in this field have important 
implications for China’s sovereignty claims in the SCS, and they merit a 
discussion. 
China’s first national statement regarding its territorial sea was in its 
Declaration of the Government of PRC on Territorial Sea which was 
announced on September 4, 1958 (1958 Declaration).161  It was 
announced five months after the first United Nations’ Conference on the 
Law of the Sea and reflected the general principles of the Geneva 
Conventions.162   
The 1958 Declaration contains four paragraphs.163  The first 
paragraph declares that a twelve nautical-mile territorial sea surrounds all 
Chinese territories including  
the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan 
and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, the Dongsha 
Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Nansha 
Islands and all other islands belonging to China which are 
separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by high 
seas.164  
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From this paragraph, it is clear that the Chinese government was 
confident about its sovereignty over the four SCS archipelagos, despite 
their distance from its mainland and being separated by high seas.165 
The second and third paragraphs establish a straight baseline method 
for the territorial sea of China and establish restrictions on foreign 
military vessels and aircraft entering its territorial sea and adjacent air 
space, noting the relevant laws and regulations of China.166  The fourth 
paragraph emphasizes that the principles provided in the second and third 
paragraphs also apply to Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu 
Islands, the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, 
the Nansha islands, and all other islands belonging to China.167  This 
indicates that straight baseline methods and territorial sea restrictions are 
also applicable to the archipelagos of the SCS. 
China’s general positions, enunciated in its 1958 Declaration, were 
effectively carried out on matters concerning its territorial seas.  For 
example, in 1992 China’s Congress enacted the Law on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone,168 which maintained the principles of the 
1958 Declaration.169  Article two of this law specifies that China’s land 
territory includes “the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha 
Islands and the Nansha Islands.”170 By specifically mentioning the 
names of these SCS islands, China has once again confirmed its 
sovereignty over these archipelagos.  The Law on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone also sets forth China’s twelve nautical mile 
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territorial sea and twenty-four nautical mile contiguous zone measured 
by straight baselines.171  
In May 1996, upon ratifying UNCLOS, China declared two sets of 
baseline coordinates—one set for its mainland and one set for the 
Paracels.172  The baselines for the mainland consist of a series of straight 
lines linking forty-nine coordinates surrounding its mainland.173  The 
baselines for the Paracels consist of a series of straight lines linking 
twenty-eight coordinates.174  China’s declaration of coordinates marked a 
concrete step in its exercise of sovereignty over the SCS archipelagos 
and brought an end to most of the uncertainty surrounding China’s 
territorial sea baseline.  However, some uncertainty remains due to the 
1996 announcement expressly stating that the remaining baselines will 
be announced at some unspecified future time.175  
China established its EEZ and continental shelf in 1998 by enacting 
the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf.176  
Although this law does not expressly refer to the SCS archipelagos, two 
note verbales clarified the U-Shaped Line includes “sovereignty over the 
islands in the South China Seas and the adjacent waters” and “sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and 
subsoil.”177  Note CML/8/2011, dated April 14, 2011, further spelled out 
China’s right to maritime zones generated by the Spratlys Islands—
specifically, a territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, and continental 
shelf.178  These diplomatic notes marked the first times China included a 
map in its official communication to the United Nations.179  By virtue of 
these notes, China has officially declared to the world its claims within 
the U-Shaped Line.  
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B. Determining the Legal Status of the Waters in the U-shaped Line 
Having clarified its claimed sovereignty over the islands of the SCS, 
China must provide further notice to the international community by 
delimiting the specific maritime zones within the U-Shaped Line.  As it 
stands, it is unclear whether China is claiming the bounded waters as 
internal waters, territorial sea, EEZ, continental shelf, or as some other 
status with its own unique features.  This Section attempts to provide a 
preliminary assessment of the legal status of the waters in the U-Shaped 
Line. 
First, the waters in the U-Shaped Line cannot be internal waters.  
Internal waters require full sovereignty and prescriptive control, yet the 
Chinese government has never interfered with non-Chinese ships sailing 
through these waters.180  In addition, the U-Shaped Line has been 
marked with unresolved boundary symbols, which are less fixed than a 
land border. 
Second, the waters contained within the U-shaped Line are not part 
of China’s territorial sea.  China’s 1958 Declaration set forth a twelve 
nautical mile territorial sea with straight baselines, applying to all of 
China’s territories—including the SCS islands.181  Therefore, the 
territorial sea of China is the belt of water extending up to twelve 
nautical miles as measured from the baselines of the SCS islands.  The 
majority of the water in the U-Shaped Line, however, lies beyond twelve 
nautical miles.  Consequently, the majority of the water within the U-
Shaped Line is not a part of China’s territorial sea.  
Third, the waters in the U-Shaped Line do not constitute high seas.  
If the waters beyond the twelve mile territorial sea measured from the 
baselines of the SCS islands, why did the Chinese government undertake 
a series of legal procedures and make pronouncements to the world?  The 
U-shaped Line was drawn to roughly follow the median line between the 
coasts of adjacent states, indicating a specified scope of China’s 
jurisdictional boundary in the SCS.  Thus, the waters in the U-shaped 
Line can not constitute high seas.  
Lastly, should the water inside the U-shaped Line be considered 
some other maritime zone?  The only other possibilities under UNCLOS 
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are archipelagic waters, contiguous zone, EEZ, or continental shelf.182  
These waters certainly should not be considered archipelagic waters.  
Existing primarily on continental mainland, China has never claimed 
archipelagic status.  Additionally, the waters within the U-Shaped Line 
should not be considered a contiguous zone, EEZ, or continental shelf 
because China has not yet determined any territorial sea baseline 
coordinates for islands other than the Paracels.   Indeed, no established 
maritime zone is a good fit for the waters within the U-shaped Line of 
the SCS; these waters bear unique status attached with historical 
features.183 
China’s claim within the U-Shaped Line is often described as 
“historical sovereignty” and its legitimacy has been questioned against 
modern law of the sea.184  If this description refers to the waters inside 
the line, the misconception might have originated from  China‘s 
statement that “[n]o provisions of [the 1998 EEZ and Continental Shelf  
Law l]aw can prejudice [the] historical rights” that China enjoys.185  
However, this statement does not specify what provisions might affect 
China’s historical rights, and it is not clear what “historical rights” the 
law references.186  Arguably, historical rights referred to are the waters 
within the U-Shaped Line.187  
UNCLOS recognizes historic title or historic waters in articles 10(6), 
15, and 46(b), but does not define them.188  Commentators have 
observed that the UNCLOS regime for such waters is to be determined 
“in accordance with customary international law.”189  In the SCS, 
China’s history of occupation, natural resource exploitation, and 
administrative control of the SCS archipelagos has its earliest recordings 
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in the Han Dynasty.190  Since the Song Dynasty, China has exercised 
authority over the waters—albeit with some interruptions.  Moreover, 
China has demonstrated its political will to retain authority over the 
islands through diplomatic and military means.   
The waters in the U-Shaped Line have a unique status given 
historical characteristics and traditional rights.  Accordingly, these 
considerations justify different management.  Although China did not 
mention “historic rights” or “historic waters” in its note verbales, the 
specific status of the waters in the U-Shaped Line needs to be determined 
in accordance with recognized principles of international law and state 
practice.  China’s foremost task is to comply with UNCLOS by issuing 
maps or geographic coordinates setting out the limits of the maritime 
zones (territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZs, and continental shelves) 
for the features in the SCS, as it did with the Paracels.  
Regarding the entitlement of islands or rocks to maritime zones, it is 
important to note that the majority of the SCS insular features are reefs 
and, thus, are subject to questions of whether these features are capable 
of or entitled to generate maritime zones on their own, such as an EEZ or 
continental shelf.  Once the maritime status of these islands and rocks are 
defined, appropriate maritime zones may be delimited.  If overlapping 
boundaries between China and other claimants result, then issues of 
resource exploitation and joint development may be properly negotiated.   
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS: UNCLOS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
There are numerous disputes in the SCS, and the situation has 
become increasingly complex.  Considerable disagreement exists 
between China and its maritime neighbors over questions of fact and law.  
Additionally, the involvement of non-regional states has only increased 
the level of complexity in the SCS.  
As the largest state bordering the SCS and a core party to the dispute, 
China’s territorial sovereignty and integrity to Spratlys Islands has been 
seriously affected.  Yet, there are lessons for China to take away from the 
disputes. Over the years, China’s lack of concrete action in clarifying its 
claims in the SCS has created a very politically troublesome situation.  
China has not only missed opportunities in enhancing its control of the 
Spratlys, but also faced the challenge to gain support from the 
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international community for its sovereignty.191  China must take 
effective steps to protect its national interests and secure its sovereignty 
claim.192  
To achieve its desired protection, it is important that China clarify its 
SCS claims in a manner consistent with UNCLOS.  UNCLOS is not a 
magic document that will swiftly resolve all the problems encountered by 
the states, and it does not provide readily available answers that will 
immediately settle the SCS disputed claims; however, it does provide 
useful guidelines for states seeking a solution.  
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